‘The battle began not long before dark on November thirtieth, a still, windless, hazy Indian summer day, when the smoke of battle hung low. If General Hood had doubted the courage of his soldiers the night before, he could not now. They swept across a mile of open country, without protection, against well-covered troops, charging with desperate bravery, but little coordination. Brigades were thrown forward singly as they came on the ground, in an attempt to take the works in the short hour of daylight that was left. The charging Confederates reached the works, and in a few places were able to make lodgements which they held by hand-to-hand fighting far into the night. Some Union officers report as many as thirteen separate assaults made on their positions. In the middle of the night, with scattered fighting still going on, Schofield withdrew from Franklin, crossed the Harpeth and took up his retreat to Thomas at Nashville, eighteen miles away. The Confederate loss was appalling, forty-five hundred killed and wounded in less than an hour’s general fighting.’
Robert Selph Henry: The Story of the Confederacy, K&K, (2000), Page 430
The frustrating aspect regarding the Confederate military effort during the American Civil War (1861-1865) is that whilst lacking the material sources (including a male population of military service age) – the Confederate States of America (CSA) possessed such good and effective leadership – that its brave soldiers “nearly” inflicted decisive defeats upon the Union forces time and time again, when experiencing a cycle of wins, losses, and draws on the battlefield. Whilst this was happening, the Union military advisors understood that to beat the CSA, Washington required a number of armies that drastically outnumbered the available manpower the Confederacy could muster at any one time. Initially, the CSA pursued a policy of “drawing” all available forces from across the South to focus on one specific geographical point to counter the any Union attack. The idea to this tactic was that the Union could not attack any one place for any length of time – if they realistically expected to win a decisive victory without simply wasting the lives of their men whilst negatively affecting the morale of the nation. Yes – in places like Vicksburg, the Union did retain what were effectively “agitation” forces for years (to a lesser or greater extent) – whilst other operations were pursued with considerable vigour.
Indeed, this is how Lincoln and his military advisors learned to establish and manage simultaneous ongoing offensives into the South. Even so, Jefferson Davis possessed perhaps the greatest General (Robert E Lee) North America has ever produced – including many others who flocked to the banner of the bars and stars (such as Stone-Wall Jackson). Greatness of military mind, and a firm belief in the Cause of the Confederacy amongst the ordinary rank and file led to the CSA managing to equal-up things on the battlefield. Of course, the Confederacy pursued this policy because it was all the South could realistically do, whilst waiting in hope that Great Britain or France would a) diplomatically recognise the CSA, and b) militarily support the CSA in its self-defence war against the Union. As time rolled-on, and the Confederacy forces were repelled at Gettysburg on July 3rd, 1863 (a day before Vicksburg finally fell to the Union on July 4th, 1863) – the chances of the British or French entering the war on the side of the Confederacy became an ever-unrealistic political aspiration. As a consequence, although manpower was diminishing and meagre raw resources dwindling, the iron will, and discipline of the ordinary men remained strong despite widespread starvation, lack of clothing, and effective weaponry.
The Union, which possessed potentially endless supplies of raw materials, food, and manpower (the latter primarily through migration), Lincoln’s Generals perfected the strategy of alternating full-scale attacks in the Eastern theatre and then switching to the Western theatre – before alternating back again. This see-saw approach enabled the fresh armies of the Union to deploy in sensitive Confederate areas, inflict substantial material damage, before withdrawing and re-deploying elsewhere. On occasion, if a significant location was captured and could be held – the Union forces would remain on CSA territory as a means of irritation to the enemy. Such captured areas could serve, at a latter date, as a launch-area for a renewed offensive, etc. This policy work for the Union as each battle cost the CSA vital resources that could barely be replaced. By early 1865, when the Union had amassed a functional army of around 200,000 men (with a further reserve of around 50,000) – all the Confederacy could muster was a mere 32,000 able-bodied men – excluding the working-wounded. The Union blockade of the Southern coast was so effective that fresh personnel and supplies could barely get through (there was a slow trickle from abroad – but no way near enough to fully support the daily and long-term needs of the CSA).
Even so, right up until the end of the war, the Confederacy still managed to inflict the odd defeat upon Union forces. Furthermore, impartial witnesses that watched the battles, including Union participants on the receiving end of CSA aggression, often spoke with admiration about what they saw. Generally, despite terrible deprivation, the Confederate rank and fill – which included Black, Chinese, and Indian volunteers and many Europeans from abroad – often punched above their weight and gave a thoroughly good account of themselves. Bear in mind that the wounded often spent days lying on the battlefield – before dying in agony – as medical care was not as common as it is today in a modern army. One such spectacle occurred on November 30th,1864 during the Battle of Franklin – which saw the Confederate Army of Tennessee (numbering around 20,000 men) launch a highly disciplined assault upon the Union lines. This Confederate attack was comprised of 100 Regiments, 18 Brigades, and 6 Infantry Divisions:
‘Cleburne’s concern about the tiered enemy works was soon translated into an altered combat-formation. By his specific request, he obtained permission to form his Division in column of Brigades, wishing to expose as small a front as possible. From this formation, he would deploy into line of battle within small-arms range of the enemy’s lines. The would then, by Hood’s orders, charge with fixed-bayonets against the enemy’s advancing parapets. Reserving their fire until this line was broken… The Confederate Army had deployed in an almost Parade Ground formation… As far as the eye could see, the ranks of butternut and grey extended across the gently undulating farm-land. The men were gaunt, many looked like they had been starved – wrote a soldier – and they stood in tattered ranks with their bayonets already fixed on their imported Enfields, Austrians, and captured Springfield rifle-muskets. Their uniforms were threadbare and worn, with many wearing captured Federal clothing. Some had no coats or shoes, and in their haversack, they carried mostly sugarcane and hickory nuts. Nearly all were ragged and dirty. They looked more like a band of robbers than soldiers thought one Federal Private – who saw some captured prisoners. Another Union soldier noted that the Rebels ‘rob our dead because they have nothing to wear – especially for our shoes and coats. They still retained their droopy-felt hats – which gives them a hasty look.’ They are all that the Confederacy could muster – what was left of the hardened spirit of the middle-South. Yet their ragged appearance belied their ultimate worth. They were the essence of indomitable courage – the best of their generation. A fierce and reckless spirit shone-forth – one that seemed to say that they could not be overcome, no matter what their fate. Perhaps it was their pride which was most evident. Here were the men who had suffered all – and were about to suffer even more…
With banners flying and their drums beating – here came the entire Confederate Army sweeping onward straight for the Federal lines – and moving with the speed of an avalanche! It was the most awesome sight these Illinois Veterans had ever beheld… The sudden appearance of the Confederate Army was that of a solid human-wave – wrote an eye-witness. The sight was grand, awesome, and terrible all at once. It was a lifelong impression forged in an instant. The brown-grey wall of uniforms, the red-tattered flags, a rolling-wavering sweep of movement, dim yet profound in the hazy-yellow sunshine. They were images and colours which simply overwhelmed the eye. Growing louder was the sound of marching men – like the distant rumble of mountain boulders. An almost unheard-of occurrence where an entire attacking army could be seen from high-ground. The frontal assault at Franklin would be remembered by some as the most imposing military spectacle of the entire war. It was worth a year of one’s lifetime to witness the marshalling and advance of the Rebel line – thought a Federal eye-witness. Nothing could be more suggestive of strength, discipline, and resistless power – he added. Even as the grey line swept forward over Privet-Knob – a Regimental Commander in John C Brown’s Division could but marvel at the magnificent spectacle. Bands were playing, General and Staff Officers and gallant couriers were riding in front of and between the lines. One-hundred battle flags were waving – while 20,000 brave men were marching in perfect order against the foe. The sight inspired every man. From the over-view on Winstead Hill, hundreds of non-combatants onlookers had gathered to watch the assault. The pageantry was splendid – wrote an observer. It was as if the soldiers were marching on Dress Parade. Jolting everyone to their senses, Lieutenant Milton A Mitchell’s Section of 3-inch rifled guns opened with a roar – firing shell a range of over 400-yards directly at Cheetham’s line. It was about 4:10 pm and thereafter the minutes were as but fleeting instants, each fraught with a thousand events and emotions.’
Wiley Sword: The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah – Springhill, Franklin and Nashville, Brilliance Audio, (2019), Part XVII, Chapters I & II
NOTE: Major General Patrick R. Cleburne was both “Irish” and “British” – as Ireland was a British colony at the time. Furthermore, Major General Patrick R. Cleburne had been a Private in the British Army (based in Ireland) and rose to the rank of Corporal. Later, he migrated to the US and studied and practiced Law – before joining the Confederate Army during the Civil War as a “Private” – rising to the rank of “Major General”. Cleburne suggested that the Slaves of the South should be freed and recruited into the Confederate Army as a means to change Southern society for the better – and solve the manpower shortages throughout the CSA military. His suggestion was rejected at the time.
SANGHA KOMMUNE (SSR) 